U.S. Supreme Court

May 17, 2010

Supreme Court Opinions Issued This Morning in Graham v. Florida, U.S. v. Comstock, and Abbott v. Abbott

This morning the United States Supreme Court issued three opinions.

In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without the opportunity for parole for a nonhomicide crime.

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Chief Justice Roberts concurred only in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia and in part by Justice Alito, who also filed a dissent. The opinions in Graham v. Florida are available here.

April 22, 2010

Stevens: 8-1 Supreme Court Decision Holds Criminal Statute Unconstitutionally Overbroad and Invalid under the First Amendment

by Kish Law

This week, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, which criminalized the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animals being harmed in illegal ways for commercial gain, is unconstitutionally overbroad. Although it had an exemption clause for portrayals with “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” the statute criminalized a significant amount of speech protected by the First Amendment.

The statute defines “depictions of animal cruelty” as including portrayals of animals being “wounded or killed,” among other actions with more cruel connotations. The Court held that, because “wound” and “kill” are not ambiguous, they may not be interpreted in light of neighboring words that imply cruelty. In addition, “depictions of animal cruelty” include any wounding or killing that is illegal where the depiction is sold or possessed, regardless of whether that action was legal where it occurred.

Thus, depictions of any animal being harmed legally could be criminalized if possessed or sold in a place where such actions were not legal. The prime example of criminalized protected speech was hunting magazines and television shows that are distributed or aired in Washington, D.C., where all hunting is illegal. It could also criminalize representations of the treatment of livestock where states have different agricultural regulations.

April 5, 2010

Berghuis v. Smith: Supreme Court Unanimously Reverses Jury-Diversity-Based Habeas Case in Favor of Government

by Kish Law

Last week the Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Smith in favor of the government. The Court held that criminal defendant Smith was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on his claim that the jury selection process had violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.

Because Smith was challenging his state conviction in a federal habeas corpus petition, under AEDPA, the federal courts could grant relief only if the state court decisions involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously held that Smith had not met this burden under the law established by Duren v. Mississippi in 1979.

Under Duren, to establish a prima facie violation of this Sixth Amendment right, a defendant must show:

April 1, 2010

Padilla v. Kentucky: Sixth Amendment Effective Assistance of Counsel Requires Criminal Defense Lawyers to Advise Clients When Pleas Carry a Risk of Deportation

by Kish Law

Yesterday the federal Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky. The Court recognized its “responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant – whether a citizen or not – is left to the mercies of incompetent counsel. To satisfy this responsibility, [the Court held] that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.”

Until yesterday’s decision, the lower federal courts almost unanimously held that lawyers are required to tell their clients about only ‘direct’ consequences of pleading guilty. Deportation (now called “removal”) has long been seen as a potential collateral consequence of certain convictions. While professional norms have long required such advice, until Padilla, failure to so advise did not meet the Strickland test for ineffectiveness. The Court held that the direct/collateral distinction is inappropriate in a Strickland claim concerning deportation risk.

The Strickland test has two prongs. First the Court must decide whether the attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The second prong, prejudice to the defendant, was not at issue in Padilla because the lower courts had not reached it. This second prong may be difficult to satisfy in many of these cases because many states require trial courts to advise defendants who plead guilty of potential immigration offenses. Here in Georgia, in 2000 trial courts began advising defendants that a guilty plea “may have an impact” on the defendant’s immigration status. However, Padilla may be a useful tool for challenging certain guilty plea convictions in Georgia prior to 2000.

February 24, 2010

Upcoming Changes in the Supreme Court?

by Kish Law

Tom Goldstein at SCOTUSblog discussed his predictions for the future of the Supreme Court yesterday. He predicts that Justice Stevens will retire, but Justice Ginsburg will remain on the bench. His entry includes an in-depth analysis of potential nominees to replace Justice Stevens, concluding that Solicitor General Elena Kagan is the most likely choice for the Obama Administration.

Read the full post here.