Articles Posted in Sentencing

We do lots of sentencing hearings in federal criminal cases, here in Atlanta, throughout Georgia and other parts of the country, like Florida, Alabama, New York, California and Tennessee. Whatever state they are in, all federal judge are first required to consult the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when deciding the appropriate sentence for a person who has either pled guilty to or who a jury has found is guilty of a federal crime. These Guidelines are amended all the time, and it seems for some categories of crimes the suggested range of punishment keeps getting more and more harsh. However, what we lawyers call the “Ex Post Facto” clause from the Fifth Amendment to our beloved Constitution says that it is unconstitutional to increase punishments “after the fact.” Several days ago ( I was not able to get to this post as I have been in federal court all week) the United States Supreme Court held that the Ex Post Facto clause requires a new sentencing hearing for an Illinois businessman who had been convicted of bank fraud. The case is Peugh v. United States and can be accessed here.

Mr. Peugh was convicted of five counts of bank fraud in a scheme that caused more than $2.5 million in losses by the victim bank. The crimes took place around 1999 and 2000. However, when he went to court years later, the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his sentencing hearing suggested 70 to 87 months in prison. Peugh objected to use of the 2009 guidelines, insisting that the judge should use the guidelines in effect at the time of his crimes. Under those earlier Guidelines, the appropriate sentence ranged from 30 to 37 months in prison. Peugh argued that relying on higher guidelines enacted after his crimes were committed would amount to the use of an ex post facto law. The sentencing judge rejected the argument, and sentenced Peugh to 70 months in prison. A panel of the Seventh US Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the ex post facto argument and upheld the sentence.
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Like our federal cases here in Atlanta and throughout the country, it is important to keep in mind how a federal sentencing hearing takes place. The various phases of the federal sentencing process require the Defendant’s attorney to not only know the law, but also to know the procedure, so that “objections” are properly preserved. A decision issued today by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit makes this point. In that case, the attorney properly objected, thus preserving the issue for appeal. In the Court of Appeals, the Defendant raised the same argument, and the appellate tribunal agreed. The result is a lower sentence for the Defendant. The case is United States v. Washington.

Mr. Washington was charged in a large fraud scheme involving banks and credit card customers. He pled guilty. As a result, the United States Probation Officer prepared the very important document called the “Presentence Investigation Report”, which is often called the “PSR”. The PSR has two major parts, one of which is sort of a miniature biography of the Defendant. The second part of the PSR is where the probation officer makes some recommendations as to how the complex Federal Sentencing Guidelines should apply.
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Federal criminal charges are being brought against a series of Atlanta-based employees of schools. Here and here are some stories. We represent one of the people accused in these matters, which are very difficult to defend. These cases are part of an ever-expanding national trend. We have done many such cases, involving doctors, federal employees, computer programmers, salesmen and others. No matter what business our client is in, all of these cases require sensitivity, compassion, along with a willingness to try new tactics in the right situation.

Many of these cases involve clients with eerily similar backgrounds. Many of our clients are men who have been happily and successfully married for many years. These men often are exemplary fathers. I recall one poignant sentencing hearing where the 20-something daughters of our client made such fantastic speeches that the Judge commented how as a feminist she could not help but praise our client and his wife for raising such amazing daughters. After the sentencing hearing, that Judge even took off her robe, and came down to spend some time with the wife and daughters.
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Good lawyering in federal criminal cases often requires that the attorney not only be a student of the law, he or she needs to also recognize when a particular issue might be a current “loser” but the higher courts are waiting to change the rule. That might turn out to be the situation in Alleyne v. United States, a case recently accepted for review by the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Alleyne’s prescient Public Defenders objected to a ruling that was correct at the time it was made, but early next year the Supreme Court will hear arguments as to whether the rule should be changed.

In 2000, the Supreme Court issued the landmark ruling of Apprendi v. New Jersey. That case held for the first time that any fact that can change the maximum punishment to which a Defendant is exposed must be pled in the indictment, and proven to the jury by the usual “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. This is very important because until that time many facts that result in potentially longer prison sentences could be decided by one person, the sentencing judge, and that judge could use the less stringent “preponderance” evidentiary standard.
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The Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion today on a fraud case out of Florida involving issues related to restitution. The appellate court reversed the restitution order, ruling that the government had not adequately proved the amount of restitution, nor had the district judge calculated restitution based on specific factual findings. The case is United States v. Singletary.

Like many of the federal fraud cases we handle, Singletary involved questions of how much “loss” was involved, along with how much “restitution” could be ordered. Many lawyers forget that these are two very distinct issues. “Loss” is a calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and this figure is one of the major factors that drives the calculation of the prison sentence in a fraud case. The Guidelines tell a judge to calculate “loss” as the “greater of actual or intended loss”. Additionally, the Guidelines also instruct that loss can be “estimated” when the proof is difficult to establish.

Restitution is quite different than “loss.” Restitution is based on the loss the victim actually suffered. In other words, “loss” can be much higher than restitution when the defendant tried to get money but was unsuccessful.

Ed. Note: On November 1, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2010 Amendments to the federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, along with a temporary, emergency amendment to implement Section 8 of the Fair Sentencing Act. On the whole, the amendments reflect a reduction in federal criminal sentences and provide the sentencing judge with additional discretion. We have been posting analyses of some of the more important changes to the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission’s reader-friendly guide to the 2010 amendments is available here.

In this post in August, we summarized the impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduces the disparity between criminal sentences for crack and powder cocaine from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1 and eliminates the mandatory minimum five-year sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine. The Act also provides for higher sentencing guidelines for all drugs in some cases. This amendment brings about the changes made by the Act.

Specifically, the emergency amendment makes the following changes to the Sentencing Guidelines to implement the Fair Sentencing Act:

Ed. Note: On November 1, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2010 Amendments to the federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, along with a temporary, emergency amendment to implement Section 8 of the Fair Sentencing Act. On the whole, the amendments reflect a reduction in federal criminal sentences and provide the sentencing judge with additional discretion. We have been posting analyses of some of the more important changes to the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission’s reader-friendly guide to the 2010 amendments is available here.

This amendment clarifies the remediation efforts required for effective compliance and ethics programs used by organizations. The Guidelines now suggest that defendant organizations should provide restitution and other forms of remediation, self-report, and cooperate with authorities. The organization should also ensure the program is effective, perhaps by including the use of an outside professional advisor.

The amendment also creates a limited exception to the general prohibition against applying a 3-level decrease for having a program when high-level personnel are involved in the offense. The organization may receive the decrease if:

Last week, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Williams. The Court held that the sentencing judge clearly erred in granting a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and denying an enhancement for obstruction of justice because Mr. Williams testified to his factual innocence at trial after withdrawing his guilty plea.

Following a car chase in Atlanta, Georgia that culminated with Mr. Williams receiving a gun shot to an eye, Williams was charged with assaulting three federal marshals. Williams entered a guilty plea, but withdrew it due to the potential sentence. He then testified at trial that he hadn’t known his pursuers in unmarked vehicles were law enforcement officers.

The sentencing judge relied on a presentence report that recommended he receive three points off for acceptance of responsibility. She explained, “I think particularly in this case where he was shot, his ability to have his own trial and tell his story was important. I mean, I consider that an important part of my job, is to provide trials to people who have a story that legitimately needs telling.” Explaining that she would not punish Mr. Williams for exercising his constitutional right to trial, she awarded two points off for acceptance of responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was “erroneous to award a reduction for acceptance of responsibility when a defendant denies guilt in the face of evidence to the contrary” and Mr. Williams had done exactly that by “admitt[ing] he was guilty initially, but withdr[awing] his plea” and then testifying to his innocence “despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”

Ed. Note: On November 1, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2010 Amendments to the federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, along with a temporary, emergency amendment to implement Section 8 of the Fair Sentencing Act. On the whole, the amendments reflect a reduction in federal criminal sentences and provide the sentencing judge with additional discretion. We are posting analyses of some of the more important changes to the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission’s reader-friendly guide to the 2010 amendments is available here.

This amendment responds to the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. The Act created a new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 249 for injuring any person because of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. That offense is now referred to §2H1.1 (Offenses Involving Individual Rights). It also broadened the definition of “hate crime” to include crimes motivated by actual or perceived “gender identity.” §3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim) gained an application note to account for the expanded definition.

The Act created a second new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 1389, prohibiting attacks on members of the military, which is now referred to §§2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault), 2A2.3 (Minor Assault), and 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud).

This Monday the federal Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott v. United States, together with Gould v. United States. The Court held 8-0 (Justice Kagan took no part in the decision) that a defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum sentence specified in § 924(c) unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by that subsection imposes an even greater minimum. We are disappointed that the Court disregarded the plain language of the statute.

As we discussed in this post when the Court granted certiorari, § 924(c) contains a prefatory clause, called the “except” clause, that applies the subsection “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law.” We read that clause as plainly prohibiting the application of § 924(c) where “any other” greater minimum sentence applies. The government disagreed, arguing that the clause is triggered only when another provision commands a longer term for conduct that violates §924(c).

Gould argued the plain language of the clause: that it applied whenever any count of conviction at sentencing required a greater minimum sentence. Abbott proposed two potential happy mediums: that the minimum sentence “otherwise provided” must be one imposed for the §924(c) predicate crime or, in the alternative, for a firearm offense involving the same firearm that triggered §924(c). The Court rejected all three arguments.

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